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Abstract
The prohibition of undue internal dealings under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (‘the
MRFTA’) is controversial from the perspectives of practitioners and academics as well. Many issues
have recently been discussed and resolved by courts on undue internal dealing cases. This article
presents a brief overview of the prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA by focusing
upon the legislative intent and requirements for finding an internal dealing in violation of the Act
articulated by relevant court interpretations. 
To be sure, the prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA mainly aims at concentration
of economic power by large business groups commonly known as ‘Chaebol.’ The actual legislation,
however, is not consistent with the intents of the legislators, which creates unnecessary confusion in
enforcing the prohibition of undue internal dealings and sometimes misleads the court in ruling on
each case. 
To cure those problems and secure a clear standard in enforcing the prohibition of undue internal
dealings, legislative improvement is called for. Among others, it should be positively considered to
provide for the prohibition of undue internal dealings as a measure to repress concentration of
economic power under the Chapter 3 of the MRFTA. This will ensure the consistency between the
legislative intent and the statutory regulation of undue internal dealings, and thereby enable the
enforcers with the competition authority and practitioners to avoid unnecessary confusion on the
prohibition of undue internal dealings.
I.  Introduction
The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (1980, hereafter ‘the MRFTA’),
the main Korean antitrust law prohibits ‘undue internal dealings.’1) The Article 23
Paragraph (1) of the Act provides, as a type of unfair trade practice, for an “act
assisting a person with a special interest or other companies by providing advanced
payment, loans, manpower, immovable assets, stocks and bonds, or intellectual
properties thereto, or by transacting under substantially favorable terms therewith.” 2)
In turn, the Enforcement Decree of the Act lists, as subtypes of undue internal
dealings, undue financial support, undue asset support and undue manpower
support.3)
The National Assembly enacted the prohibition of undue internal dealings by the
1996 amendment to the MRFTA. The prohibition of undue internal dealings is
understood as a competition policy measure designed to prevent large business
groups, so called ‘Chaebol’ from maintaining or strengthening their concentrated
economic power by illegitimate methods and/or from giving their affiliated
companies unfair competitive advantages over their competitors in each relevant
market. Just as the ‘Chaebol’ phenomenon in Korea is unique in nature, the
prohibition of undue internal dealings is considered so unique that its equivalent can
not be found in any antitrust laws of developed countries. For some reason or other,
it has been an object of continuing debate among antitrust practitioners and policy
makers as well as academics in Korea. Some academics have argued that the
MRFTA over-regulates internal dealings inside business groups by prohibiting even
benevolent ones which tend to promote efficiencies. Academics on the other side
and officials in the Fair Trade Commission, the Korean competition authority have
continuously given firm support to the idea underlying the prohibition of undue
internal dealings pointing to the fact that the Chaebols keep trying to maintain their
economic power through internal dealings unduly advantageous to their affiliates or
1) Internal dealings are defined here as dealings between affiliated companies of a business group or between an
affiliated company of a business group and persons who have a special interest with the business group.
2) The Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Article 23 Paragraph (1) Subparagraph 7.
3) The Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Appendix 1 related to Article 36
Paragraph 1, Section 10. 
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prohibiting undue internal dealings with the purpose of addressing problems
associated with excessive concentration of economic power by Chaebols. The term
‘Chaebol’ is used in Korea to describe a huge business group, controlled by a small
number of close family members, that has tens of affiliated companies operating
mostly in unrelated markets. The family members have control of the whole
business group typically by holding a very small percentage of stocks of the major
affiliated companies supported by a complex cross-shareholding system among the
affiliated companies.5) They are also more interested in maintaining their
management and the overall viability of the business group as a whole than
profitability of each affiliated company. 
It is well recognized that Chaebols have made a great contribution to the rapid
growth of the Korean economy since the 1960s. They have built modernized plants
on a large scale necessary for massive exports which is the core of the economic
growth policy driven by the Korean government and generated by the vast majority
of employment opportunities for skilled workers and educated young men and
women since early the 1960s. They have also played a key role, however, in creating
the dark side of the Korean economy. They have commonly over-diversified into
tens of unrelated business areas, which is called ‘fleet-style management.’ Tens of
affiliated companies of a ‘Chaebol’ compete with their competitors in each market
using their total management resources, i.e. experienced management, highly skilled
workers, financing capability based not on their individual assets but on total assets
of the entire business group as if they were a single company. As a matter of course,
they enjoy substantial unfair competitive advantages over competitors unaffiliated
with any large business group and usually win the competition. The results are not
only highly concentrated markets, for almost all the major products in Korea and
significantly high entry barriers to those markets6) but also concentration of wealth in
5) Leaders-in-fact(‘same person’ under the MRFTA) and their family members of the 13 largest business
groups only hold 1.5% and 2.6% of total stock of the affiliated companies belonging to the business groups
respectively. See Fair Trade Commission, The Analysis on the Stock Ownership of the Large Business Groups
Subject to the Restrictions on the Total Amount of Shareholdings, Aug. 2004.
6) CR3(Concentration Ratio for the top three companies) was beyond 95% for 1,148 manufacturing
items(34.5% of the manufacturing industry) and average CR3 of all the manufacturing items was 78.6% in 1998.
See Korean Development Institute, Research Report funded by the FTC, Dec. 1999.
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persons with a special interest. 
The Fair Trade Commission actively enforced the prohibition of undue internal
dealings during the period of 1998 ~ 2002 when the Korean economy suffered from
a currency crisis and had to rely upon the International Monetary Fund (hereafter
‘IMF’) for massive loans to overcome the crisis. During the period, the Chaebols
also experienced unprecedented hardships and made much use of internal dealings to
maintain their economic power by preventing their affiliated companies from going
bankrupt one after another. On the other hand, the Korean economic policy makers
and officials with the Fair Trade Commission heavily affected by the policy
perspectives deemed undue internal dealings to be one of the greatest evils that
weakened the competitiveness of the Korean corporations and thus caused the IMF
crisis as well. The Fair Trade Commission focused its enforcement efforts upon
undue internal dealings committed by the five to six leading business groups. It
made twelve rounds of massive investigations into undue internal dealings by
business groups and, as a result, issued hundreds of corrective orders and levied
surcharge of about \ 327.2 billion ($ 272.6 million) during the period of 1998 ~
2002.4)
The prohibition of undue internal dealings has a short history of the government
enforcement and judiciary reviews as well as scholarly discussions. There have been
a lot of issues left unresolved as to requirements for finding an undue internal
dealing in violation of the Act. Recently, however, the issues have been being
discussed and settled, at least for practitioners, one after another through court
holdings and reasoning. This article presents a brief overview of the prohibition of
undue internal dealings under the Act focusing upon the legislative intent and
requirements for finding an internal dealing in violation of the Act, articulated by
relevant court interpretations.
II.  Legislative Intent to Prohibit Undue Internal Dealings 
The Fair Trade Commission proposed and the National Assembly enacted the bill
4) Fair Trade Commission, Result of Investigations of Undue Internal Dealings, 2004 (unpublished document). 
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capabilities, or efficient distribution networks, but on the basis of financial assistance
from its affiliated companies. As a result, the affiliated company which might not
have survived without undue internal dealings can survive and even win the
competition over more efficient competitors. A worse case is that, after more
efficient competitors are driven out of the market, the surviving affiliated company
now in a monopolistic position exploits consumers by fixing monopoly prices. What
makes the situation worse is the fact that there would be a substantial barrier to entry
into the market where an affiliated company is being financially supported by tens of
its affiliated companies through undue internal dealings. A potential new entrant
should take into consideration not only the management assets of the existing
participants in the target market but also the overall management assets of the whole
business group that the participants belong to. 
Second, undue internal dealings can make the affiliated companies formerly in
good financial condition caught in trouble, as well as the entire business group in the
long run. Undue internal dealings may inherently transfer assets without proper
compensations from a company to its affiliated companies, and the transfers are
usually from companies in better financial condition to their affiliates in worse
condition. Recurring undue internal dealings on a large scale may even destroy the
financial soundness of affiliated companies formerly in sound financial condition by
pumping out their ‘core competence’, which may drive affiliated companies within
the business group into insolvency one after another. Considering the relative
socioeconomic magnitude of a large business group in the Korean economy, a
failure of any large business group proved to be a disaster for the whole national
economy and society during the period of the IMF exchange shortage crisis. 
Undue internal dealings also have a negative effect on wealth distribution. Undue
internal dealings are commonly made under the direction of the leaders-in-fact, so
called “same person” under the MRFTA,8) for maintaining their control of the
business group or keeping viability of the entire business group. This means that
undue internal dealings aim to serve the leaders-in-fact and their family instead of
the stockholders or creditors in general. More often than not, in reality undue
internal dealings harm the interests of the minority stockholders or creditors of the
8) The “same person” is a person or company who substantially controls a business group. See the MRFTA
Article 2 Subparagraph 2.
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the hands of a few persons who have a special relationship, typically family
relationship, which lays ready foundations for collusive ties between politicians and
businesses.
This situation created significant concerns among the public in general, which
induced the legislators to introduce a series of policy measures to repress the economic
power concentration into the MRFTA. Those measures include Limitation on
Establishment of a Holding Company(Art. 8-2), Prohibition of Cross
Shareholding(Art. 9), and Restrictions on Total Amount of Shareholding of Other
Companies(Art. 10) in the 1986 amendment to the MRFTA and Prohibition of Debt
Guarantees for Affiliated Company(Art. 10-2) later in 1992 amendment to the Act. As
they had originally aimed at limiting enlargement of business groups by means of
shareholding and borrowing from financial institutions, they came to prove ineffective
in preventing the groups from driving competitors of their affiliated companies out of
each market by unfairly enhancing the competitive position of the affiliated companies
and thereby maintaining concentrated economic power through various undue internal
dealings. To fill the gap in regulating the excessive concentration of economic power,
some measures against internal dealings among affiliated companies of a large
business group that have an effect of rendering undue competitive advantage to the
affiliated companies over their competitors were called for.
In 1996, the legislators chose to adopt the prohibition of undue internal dealings
into the prohibition of unfair trade practices under Art. 23 of the MRFTA. The
legislative intentions publicly announced were to provide proper measures for
preventing various harms likely to be caused by undue internal dealings among
affiliated companies within a large business group. The harms that can be caused by
undue internal dealings may be summarized as these.7)
First, undue internal dealings have an anticompetitive effect on each market
where an affiliated company financially supported through the internal dealings is
operating. The affiliated company acquires competitive advantages over its
competitors not on the basis of merits, i.e. technical superiority, better management
7) See for the details of harms caused by undue internal dealings Young Soo Woo, “The Necessity of
Regulating Undue Internal Dealings and Policy Goals for the FTC”, Monthly Fair Trade, Apr. 1999; Fair Trade
Commission, Footprints of Creating a Market Economy - Twenty-year History of the FTC (2001), pp. 330-331.
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measure to repress excessive concentration of economic power under Chapter 3
(Restriction on the Combination of Enterprises and Repression of the Economic
Power Concentration) of the MRFTA. The legislators decided, however, to prohibit
undue internal dealings as unfair trade practices because undue internal dealings
may be made not only among affiliated companies within a large business group but
also among companies or persons that have a relationship, other than affiliation
within a large business group, with one another.
III.  Are There ‘Supportive’ Internal Dealings? 
The first step for finding an internal dealing in violation of the MRFTA is to
answer the question, “Are there supportive internal dealings?” Supportive internal
dealings are classified under the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA as three
categories; financially supportive dealings, asset supportive dealings and manpower
supportive dealings. A financially supportive dealing is present when a company
“assist[s] a person with a special interest or other companies through the provision of
excessive economic benefit by providing them with funds, such as temporary
payment, loan, etc., at substantially low prices or by providing them with such funds
in substantial amounts.”10) An asset supportive dealing is present when a company
“assist[s] a person with a special interest or other companies through the provision of
excessive economic benefit by providing them with assets, such as real estate,
securities intangible property rights, etc., at substantially high or low costs or by
providing them with such assets in substantial amounts.” 11) Lastly, a manpower
supportive dealing is present when a company “assist[s] a person with a special
interest or other companies through the provision of excessive economic benefit by
providing them with manpower at substantially high or low costs or by providing
such manpower in substantial amounts.12)
The Unfair Internal Dealing Guidelines (hereafter ‘the Guidelines’) issued by the
10) The Enforcement Decree of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act, Appendix related to Article 36
Paragraph 1, Section 10 (1). 
11) Id. Section 10 (2).
12) Id. Section 10 (3).
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assisting companies9) for the sake of the leaders-in-fact or their family. The negative
effect on the wealth distribution can be cured by effective taxation and sufficient
protective measures for minority shareholders and creditors. Unfortunately, however,
taxation and protective measures for minority shareholders against undue internal
dealings within a business group have proved to be ineffective so far. Thus, the
MRFTA should play a role in this respect as well.
Third, undue internal dealings create disparities and inefficiencies in the national
economy. The undue internal dealing is a commonly used device for a large business
group to enter a new market by establishing an affiliated company and letting the
company take root firmly in the market within a short period of time. The Chaebols
have typically used undue internal dealings for entering new markets, like octopuses
stretching out their suckers. In addition, they have secured investment resources
from financial institutions which are limited in amount with their superior leveraging
power based upon their huge volume of transactions and magnitude of businesses
with the institutions. Even with much more promising investment opportunities,
companies unaffiliated with any large business group could not get sufficient
investment resources from financial institutions or only at a lot more
disadvantageous terms, which could create a great loss to the society in general as
well as each individual company.
In addition to economic harms, the undue internal dealings may contribute to
social and political instability by aggravating the disparity between the large and the
small and medium businesses. Increasingly growing, the large business groups have
gained capabilities to affect main government policies in their favor. This creates
concerns that relate to fundamental values attached to our democratic government
system.
After summarizing the harms the legislators tried to cure by prohibiting undue
internal dealings, it should be noted that they created troublesome issues, as
elaborated below, in interpreting the provision prohibiting undue internal dealings by
inserting it into Article 23 (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) of the MRFTA. If
the prohibition of undue internal dealings is a measure to cure the harms created
from concentration of economic power, it is logical to provide for it as a kind of
9) The assisting company here refers to a company which gives support to an affiliated company (assisted
company) through undue internal dealings.
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by the assisted party, the volume of the transaction, the economic benefit provided
through the transaction, the length of period, the number of times and the occasion
of the transaction, and the financial situation of the assisted party at the time of the
transaction, etc.17) 
One of the most important works in finding a supportive dealing is calculating a
‘fair price’ of the object of the transaction in question to be compared with the price
actually paid. The Guidelines provide that the fair price is the price that the parties
without any special interest with each other in similar conditions in terms of time,
kind, volume, period, and financial standing would have fixed for the same benefit
as the object of the transaction.18) Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that the fair
price in a financial supportive dealing case is the interest rate which the assisted
party and an independent party, usually a financial institution without any special
interest with the party would have reached in the same or similar conditions in terms
of time, kind, volume, period, financial standing, etc.19)
Nonetheless, the circumstances and objects of transaction in reality are so
different from case to case that it is extremely hard to find comparable transactions
between parties without any special interest with each other in similar conditions and
calculate the fair price. Therefore, the Guidelines provide that so called ‘general fair
interest rate’, the deposit money banks’ weighted average of interest rates on loans
which the Bank of Korea publishes every month can be used as a surrogate for the
fair interest rate calculated on the facts of each case, i.e. so called ‘individualized fair
interest rate’ in case the Fair Trade Commission is unable to find a comparable
transaction.20) The Supreme Court is, however, cautious about using the general fair
interest rate instead of an individualized fair interest rate. In Hyundai Motor Co. et
al. v. Fair Trade Commission, the Court held that since the commercial bank’s
weighted average of interest rates on loans, which was calculated on the basis of
short-term loans on checking accounts, was generally higher than interest rates of
17) Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 due 6197, 6203); Supreme Court Decision, October 14, 2004
(2001 du 2935), etc. 
18) The Unfair Internal Dealing Guidelines, Art. II. Section 5.
19 Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 du 6197, 6203); Supreme Court Decision, October 14, 2004
(2001 du 2935) , etc.
20) The Unfair Internal Dealing Guidelines, Art. III. Section 1-da.
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Fair Trade Commission also provide that “a supportive dealing is present when the
fair price of the economic benefit which the assisting party delivers, directly or
indirectly, to the assisted party is higher than that of the economic benefit which the
assisting party receives from the assisted party in return.”13) Therefore, an undue
internal dealing can be made through indirect and circumventive transaction as well
if its effect is to transfer economic benefits from the assisting party to the assisted
party. The Supreme Court also found an undue internal dealing in violation of the
MRFTA, in SKCNC Ltd. v. Fair Trade Commission,14) when SKCNC Ltd. bought
corporate papers issued by a financial institution at a price substantially higher than
the market price and had the institution buy corporate papers issued by its former
affiliated company also at price substantially higher than the market price. In
addition, the Supreme Court made a clear, in Daewoo Ltd. et al. v. Fair Trade
Commission,15) that there was a supportive dealing even without any transaction,
direct or indirect, between the assisting and the assisted party when the company
financed the purchases of automobiles by its employees from its affiliated company
with no commission.
An omission may also constitute an undue internal dealing. For example, the
Supreme Court found an internal dealing in Korea National Housing Corp. v. Fair
Trade Commission16) when the Corporation made advance payments to and failed to
settle accounts with its subsidiary, also a contractor for the Corporation by granting a
one month grace period and, thus, enabled the subsidiary to capitalize upon the
amount of money to be adjusted. The Court pointed out that the omission to settle
the accounts was equivalent to paying the subsidiary the amount equal to the
proceeds from the amount of money to be adjusted.
Another critical issue in finding a supportive dealing is whether the given
transaction was made on substantially favorable terms. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the court should decide, on the facts of each case, whether the
transaction was made on substantially favorable terms by examining the difference
between the benefit rendered by the assisting party and the benefit in return rendered
13) The Unfair Internal Dealing Guidelines, Art. II. Section 4.
14) Supreme Court Decision, March 12, 2004 (2001 du 7220).
15) Supreme Court Decision, October 14, 2004 (2001du 2935). 
16) Supreme Court Decision, September 5, 2003 (2001 du 7411).
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and paid a substantially higher rate of underwriting fees to the affiliated company
than the fair market price. The Seoul High Court would have found that the
prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA would not apply because
the object of the transaction in question was underwriting ‘services’, not any
financial instruments, assets or manpower. The Supreme Court, however, reasoned
that the legislative intent of prohibiting undue internal dealings was to secure fair
trade in markets and repress concentration of economic power and thus, Article 23
of the MRFTA provides inclusively against various forms of undue internal dealings
without excluding transactions of commodities or services even though it is not
explicitly mentioned in the list of the exemplary forms of internal dealings
prohibited.26) As a result, the Court, focusing upon the contents and effects, not the
forms of transactions in question, decided that the prohibition of undue internal
dealings under the MRFTA was applicable to transactions of commodities or
services as well if they satisfied other requirements under the Act.27) The decision
should be highly evaluated in that it focused on the actual business effects of
transactions involved instead of sticking to the letter of the statute.
IV.  When Are Internal Dealings ‘Unduly’ Supportive?
The other step, more controversial from the perspectives of both antitrust
practitioners and scholars in Korea, in finding an internal dealing in violation of the
MRFTA is to answer the question, “When are the internal dealings ‘unduly
supportive’?” It would be extremely difficult, almost impossible, to set an objective
quantitative criterion for deciding whether an internal dealing is unduly supportive
or not. The Guidelines provide that the elements that should be considered in
deciding whether a supportive dealing is ‘undue’ or not include the market
conditions for the assisted party, the changes in competitive capabilities of and
circumstances faced by small and medium companies and other competitors, the
magnitude of the support, the period of the support, the shift of market share of the
assisted party before and after the support is made, and the degree of market
26) Id. 
27) Id. 
Journal of Korean Law, Vol. 4, No.2, 2005
95
ordinary loans such as loans on issuing commercial papers, the general fair interest
rate could not be used as a surrogate for the individualized fair interest rate simply
because it was hard to calculate a fair interest rate on the basis of the facts of each
case.21) The Court rather suggested that the general fair interest rate could be used as
a surrogate for an individualized fair interest rate only when the circumstances
clearly showed that the individualized fair interest rate was not lower than the
general fair interest rate.22)
Regarding a supportive dealings, a series of controversial decisions by a lower
court emerged in 2003. The Seoul High Court shocked the officials with the Fair
Trade Commission who had stuck to the enforcement policy of prohibiting undue
internal dealings regardless of the forms of transactions used to assist affiliated
companies in Chosun Daily Newspaper v. Fair Trade Commission.23) The Court
decided that the clause in the MRFTA prohibiting undue internal dealings is ‘not’
applicable to transactions of commodities and services. The reason was that Art. 23
of the MRFTA and the relevant clause of the Enforcement Decree of the MRFTA
provide for prohibiting undue financial support, undue asset support and undue
manpower support only, not undue support through transactions of commodities or
services.24) Shocked by the decision, the Fair Trade Commission appealed to the
Supreme Court by arguing that the clause should be applicable regardless of the
forms of the transaction in question if the net effect of the transaction was to transfer
undue economic benefits from the assisting to the assisted company.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fair Trade Commission in Daewoo Corp.
Ltd. et al. v. Fair trade Commission.25) In this case, upon issuing a great deal of
unsecured corporate bonds, a plaintiff indirectly hired its affiliated securities
company as the underwriter in violation of the Securities Underwriting Regulation
21) Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 du 6197, 6203).
22) Id. 
23) Seoul High Court Decision, September 23, 2003 (2002 nu 1047). For other decisions that held the same, see
Seoul High Court Decision, October 21, 2003 (2002 nu 12252), Seoul High Court Decision, December 9, 2003
(2001 nu 3329); Seoul High Court Decision, February 3, 2004 (2001 nu 15865), and Seoul High Court Decision,
February 14, 2005 (2001 nu 16288), etc.
24) Id. 
25) Supreme Court Decision, October 14, 2004 (2001 du 2935).
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often vulnerable to equally plausible arguments raised by both parties in litigation
proceedings. Reviewing some court decisions on this issue is therefore necessary. In
Korea National Housing Corp. v. Fair Trade Commission,31) discussed above, the
Supreme Court held that making advance payments to a subsidiary, which was also a
contractor for the parent company, and granting some grace period for the subsidiary
in settling accounts with the Corporation was a prohibited undue internal dealing
under the MRFTA. Noteworthy was the Court’s reasoning that the internal dealing
should be unduly supportive because the magnitude of the supportive dealing and
the amount of economic benefit transferred by the support were substantial
compared with the assisted party’s revenue and net profit.32) Additionally, the Court
emphasized that the supportive internal dealing in question had a high probability of
creating an anticompetitive effect on the relevant market for the assisted party
because the market, i.e. the building maintenance industry consisted mostly of small-
scale businesspersons without sufficient financial resources to compete with the
assisted subsidiary.33)
Another holding in this decision that has significant practical meaning is that the
supportive dealings authorized by the government by a parent company intended to
assist an insolvent subsidiary that the parent company took over under directions of
the government as part of a government-oriented industry reorganization may not be
deemed undue internal dealings.34) The Court emphasized that the supportive internal
dealings had purposes of public interests and were necessary for preventing the
assisting parent company itself from going bankrupt since it had already given a
huge amount of debt guarantees and extended financial credit to the subsidiary.35)
From the judicial decisions made so far on undue internal dealing cases, one can
reasonably sort out facts which courts typically consider highly relevant in deciding
whether an internal dealing is unduly supportive or not. Those include the facts that
the assisted party was in financial difficulty at the time of the internal dealing in
question, that the assisted party avoided going bankrupt with the economic benefits
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opening, etc.28)
The Guidelines also continue to provide for examples which should be deemed
undue internal dealings and those that should not. Examples of the former include
cases where the internal dealing in question results in the assisted affiliated company
reaching market share 5% or becoming the third largest in a market where small and
medium companies have market share higher than 50%; cases where the assisted
party fixes its prices below those of competitors for a substantial period of time
using the economic benefit transferred through the internal dealing and, as a result, a
competitor is put in danger of insolvency; cases where the assisted party gains
competitive advantages over competitors such as superior financial capabilities,
technologies, marketing abilities, and brand images resulting from the internal
dealing; and where the internal dealing among affiliated companies belonging to a
large business group has a discouraging effect upon the assisted affiliated company’s
going out of the relevant market or entry of potential competitors.29)
Courts also consider a long list of elements instead of applying a strict criterion in
deciding whether a supportive internal dealing is undue or not. The Supreme Court
repeatedly said that the issue should be resolved pursuant to whether the internal
dealing in question created a danger of infringing upon the fairness of transactions
by restraining competition in the assisted party’s relevant market or causing a
concentration of economic power in view of the relationship between the assisting
and the assisted party, the purposes and intent of the parties in making the supportive
dealing, the market conditions and characteristics for the assisted party, the
magnitude of the support, the economic benefit transferred by the support, the period
of the support, restraint on competition in the assisted party’s market and effects on
concentration of economic power caused by the support, the changes in competitive
capabilities of and circumstances faced by small and medium companies and other
competitors, the shift of market share of the assisted party before and after the
support is made, and the degree of market opening, etc.30)
Still, the issue whether the internal dealing in question is ‘unduly’ supportive is
28) The Unfair Internal Dealing Guidelines, Art. IV. 
29) Id.
30) Supreme Court Decision, March 12, 2004 (2001 du 7220); Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 du
6197, 6203); Supreme Court Decision, April 23, 2004 (2001 du 6517).
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an internal dealing between an affiliated company belonging to a business group and
its persons with a special interest may constitute an undue internal dealing prohibited
under the MRFTA. Article 23 of the MRFTA provides for “a person with a special
interest” in addition to a company as a possible assisted party to an undue internal
dealing. Literally interpreted, therefore, the MRFTA seems to also prohibit undue
transfers of economic benefits from affiliated companies belonging to a business
group to non-corporate persons with a special interest, typically close family
members of the leader-in-fact of the business group or chief executive level
managers of the business group. The competition authority has also applied the
prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA, on several occasions, to
financial transactions transferring substantial economic benefits from affiliated
companies of major large business groups to family members of the leaders-in-fact
or chief executive officers of the business groups. 
However, it has been fiercely argued by the plaintiff companies in the course of
the related administrative suits filed against the Fair Trade Commission that the
prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA is inapplicable to
transactions with a person who is not running any business in a market. One of the
reasons commonly given was that undue internal dealings are treated as a type of
unfair trade practice provided for by Article 23 of the MRFTA and the prohibition of
unfair trade practices under Article 23 is applicable only to transactions between
undertakings, whether a corporation or non-corporate person, running a business in a
market since it requires restraints upon competition in a market.
In Samsung SDS Co. Ltd. v. Fair Trade Commission,41) a widely broadcasted case
because it was associated with a person known as the inheritor of Samsung Business
Group, the largest business group in Korea, the Seoul High Court stood against the
Fair Trade Commission on the issue. The company, an affiliated company of
Samsung business group, the largest business group in Korea, which has not listed
its shares, issued a substantial amount of bonds with warrant through a series of
stealthy and regulation-evading transactions to its persons with a special interest, i.e.
sons and daughters of the leader-in-fact and top level managers of other affiliated
companies at a price much lower than the fair market price. The Fair Trade
41) Seoul High Court Decision, July 3, 2001 (2000 nu 4790).
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gained by the internal dealing in question, that a substantial amount of economic
benefits was transferred through the internal dealing in question, that many affiliated
companies systematically supported a designated affiliated company at the similar
time,36) and that the internal dealing in question was initiated by a request by the
assisted affiliated company for purposes of supporting the affiliated company.37)
A typical defense raised by the part allegedly committing undue internal dealings
is that the internal dealing in question was motivated to meet business managerial
necessities or to enhance reasonableness of transactions such as securing stable a
supply of inputs by supporting the supplier financially. Since this defense, although
seemingly plausible from the perspective of the businessperson, has a substantial
danger of abuse in practice, the Fair Trade Commission has consistently rejected the
defense in undue internal dealing cases. The Supreme Court agreed, in Hyundai
Motor Co. et al. v. Fair Trade Commission,38) with the Fair Trade Commission. The
Court held that the issue whether an internal dealing was unduly supportive should
be resolved only from the perspective of the fairness of transactions. Mere
necessities for the business management or reasonableness of the transactions could
not negate the undue nature of supportive internal dealings.39) It should be noted,
however, that the Court did not exclude the necessities for the business management
or reasonableness of transactions out of the list of relevant elements by reasoning
that purposes of public interest, effects on consumer welfare, and the necessities for
the business management or reasonableness of transactions were also to be
considered to the extent that they had an effect upon the fairness of transactions.40)
V.  Undue Transfer of Economic Benefits to a Person with a 
Special Interest
An interesting and heavily debated issue worth discussing separately is whether
36) Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 du 6197, 6203); Supreme Court Decision, April 23, 2004
(2001 du 6517).
37) Supreme Court Decision, October 14, 2004 (2001 du 2935).
38) Supreme Court Decision, April 9, 2004 (2001 du 6197, 6203).
39) Id. 
40) Id. 
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because it enabled the leader-in-fact to transmit the magnitude of wealth to the
below generation and was likely to lay a foundation for maintaining a concentration
of economic power by a small group of family members.46) For finding an undue
internal dealing, the Court held, a potential harm should be established that the
persons with a special interest who received the economic benefits through the
internal dealing could restrain fair trade in the relevant market.47) Now, it is clear that
mere massive transfer of economic benefits to a person with a special interest is not
enough to constitute an undue internal dealing prohibited under the MRFTA. There
is an issue yet to be resolved, however. That is what evidence would suffice to
establish that an internal dealing transferring substantial economic benefits to a
person who is not running a business can create a danger of restraining fair trade in
the relevant market.
VI.  Conclusion 
The prohibition of undue internal dealings is one of the hottest topics on the
MRFTA both in practice and in academic debates. One of the reasons, which is
rather political, is that the Fair Trade Commission has enforced it rigorously mostly
against the major large business groups that have more than sufficient legal
resources to fight against the decisions by the agency. They also believe that the
rigorous enforcement against undue internal dealings could be a significant huddle
for them to maintain their concentrated economic power. Another political
explanation is that it has been heavily affected by other government policies. It
would be hard to find any issue on the MRFTA more policy-oriented than the
prohibition of undue internal dealings. One can figure out manifold policy
implications from being policy-oriented. I would point out that the enforcement
efforts on undue internal dealings by the Fair Trade Commission have fluctuated in
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Commission applied the prohibition of undue internal dealings under the MRFTA to
the transactions and levied a large amount of surcharge upon the company.42) In the
decision, the competition authority pointed out that the transfer of a substantial
amount of economic benefits to the persons with a special interest through an
evasive transaction of evading nature of financial instruments was likely to lay a
foundation for maintaining a concentration of economic power in the hands of a few
family members and so called fleet-style management.43)
In the administrative litigation, however, the Seoul High Court overruled the
decision by the Fair Trade Commission by holding that an internal dealing could be
deemed ‘undue’ only when it had an anticompetitive effect upon the market in
which the assisted party was operating and thus, a transfer of economic benefits to a
person who was not running a business in a market could not constitute a prohibited
undue internal dealing even if it had a negative effect upon the concentration of
economic power.44) The Seoul High Court decision created hot debates on the
legislative intents and proper interpretations of the prohibition of undue internal
dealings under the MRFTA. A powerful criticism, mostly from the Fair Trade
Commission, was that at least part of the legislative intent was clearly to repress the
concentration of economic power by large business groups controlled by a few
family members and the interpretation taken by the court frustrated the legislative
intent.
On appeal, the Supreme Court maintained the lower court opinion on ground
which is slightly different from that of the lower court but seems to make no
differences in practice. The Court first vacated an aspect of the lower court decision
that an internal dealing with a person who is not running a business in a market may
not constitute a prohibited internal dealing under the MRFTA. The Court held the
assisted part was not required to be an undertaking participating in a market given
the legislative intents in prohibiting undue internal dealings- partly to repress the
concentration of economic power by large business groups.45) Nevertheless, the
Court continued to hold that an internal dealing could not be deemed ‘undue’ merely
42) Fair Trade commission Decision No. 99-212 (Oct. 28, 1999).
43) Id. 
44) Seoul High Court Decision, July 3, 2001 (2000 nu 4790).
45) Supreme Court Decision , September 24 , 2004 (2001 du 6364). 
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Abstract
As a general rule, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act prohibits mergers restricting
competition in a given area of trade, mergers achieved through coercion or any other unfair methods,
or those consummated by way of acts of evasion of law. Acting either on its own authority or a
notification by a company involved in the merger, the Korea Fair Trade Commission examines in detail
whether the merger in question falls under the proscribed categories above. The “M&A Review
Guidelines,” then, set a concrete standard to be used in assessing a merger.
One of other reasons, which is rather theoretical, is that the prohibition of undue
internal dealing and its intended targets, i.e. Chaebols, are so unique that no
comparable discussion from other jurisdictions, which has often been a useful tool
for discussing issues on the MRFTA, is available. The most critical theoretical
reason, however, that created hot debates on the prohibition of undue internal
dealings should be legislative carelessness in providing for undue internal dealings
as a type of unfair trade practice under Article 23 of the MRFTA. Since the
prohibition of undue internal dealings has legislative intent quite different from other
types of unfair trade practices prohibited by the Article 23, one cannot find a
coherent standard for evaluating all types of unfair trade practices including undue
internal dealings. The lack of coherency in interpreting prohibition of unfair trade
practices has caused troublesome problems in applying the provision to undue
internal dealings as well as to other types of unfair trade practices.
To cure those problems and secure a clear standard in enforcing the prohibition of
undue internal dealings, legislative improvement is necessary. If the prohibition of
undue internal dealings mainly targeting the concentration of economic power by
large business groups keeps its viability as a competition policy goal, then, it should
be positively considered to provide for it as a measure to repress concentration of
economic power under Chapter 3 of the MRFTA. This will secure the consistency
between the legislative intents and the statutory regulation of undue internal dealings
and thereby enable the law enforcers in the competition authority and practitioners to
avoid unnecessary confusion on the prohibition of undue internal dealings.
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